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Cognitive Radio (CR) is a dynamic spectrum access approach, in which unlicensed users (or secondary users, SUs) exploit the
underutilized channels (or white spaces) owned by the licensed users (or primary users, PUs). Traditionally, SUs are oblivious to
PUs, and therefore the acquisition of white spaces is not guaranteed. Hence, a SUmust vacate its channel whenever a PU reappears
on it in an unpredictablemanner, whichmay affect the SUs’ network performance. Spectrum leasing has been proposed to tackle the
aforementioned problem through negotiation between the PU and SU networks, which allows the SUs to acquire white spaces for a
guaranteed period of time.Through spectrum leasing, the PUs and SUs enhance their network performances, and additionally PUs
maximize their respective monetary gains. Numerous research efforts have been made to investigate the CR, whereas the research
into spectrum leasing remains at its infancy. In this paper, we present a comprehensive review on spectrum leasing schemes in
CR networks by highlighting some pioneering approaches and discuss the gains, functionalities, characteristics, and challenges of
spectrum leasing schemes along with the performance enhancement in CR networks. Additionally, we discuss various open issues
in order to spark new interests in this research area.
1. Introduction
Cognitive Radio (CR) network, which is the next-generation
wireless network, aims to improve the efficiency of spectrum
utilization through dynamic spectrum access. There are
two categories of users, namely, primary users (PUs) and
secondary users (SUs). Traditionally in CR networks, the
PUs are the licensed users, and they have exclusive right to
use their respective channels, while SUs are the unlicensed
users, and they use the underutilized channels (or white
spaces) opportunistically whenever PUs are not transmitting
any packets. Hence, PUs are oblivious of the presence of SUs.
There are twomain challenges associated with the traditional
CR Networks (CRNs) that adopt the opportunistic channel
access approach. Firstly, the unpredictable PUs’ activities
at any given time can significantly degrade SUs’ network
performance (e.g., throughput and end-to-end delay) [1–4].
Secondly, channel sensing [1], which is one of the main func-
tions in the traditional CRNs, may require SUs to exchange
channel sensing outcomes among themselves, and this incurs
high amount of communication overhead resulting in higher
energy consumption and packet latency [5]. In addition to the
traditional CRNs [2, 3], there have been research activities
in the area of CR sensor networks [4]. CR sensor networks
are the next-generation wireless sensor networks that exploit
white spaces through dynamic spectrum access.
Spectrum leasing is a dynamic spectrum access technique
in which PUs and SUs form a partnership formutual benefits.
In spectrum leasing, the SUs negotiate with PUs and acquire
their white spaces [6], while the PUs lease their channels and
receive rewards in the form ofmonetary gain or network per-
formance enhancement through packet forwarding by SUs
[7].Hence, PUs are fully aware of the presence of SUs. Figure 1
presents a taxonomy of spectrum leasing, which covers its
advantages, functionalities, characteristics, and challenges.
Further descriptions about the taxonomy are found in the rest
of this section, as well as Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Generally speaking, with the use of spectrum leasing, PUs
and SUs receive the following advantages represented by (A1)
and (A2) (see Figure 1), respectively.
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of spectrum leasing in CRNs.
(A1) PU’s Gain
(A1.1) Monetary Gain. PUsmay lease its licensed chan-
nels during idle periods for financial reward
or revenue. For instance, Jayaweera et al. [6]
propose a PU’s utility function based on its
monetary gain (e.g., the price set by PUs ofwhite
spaces).
(A1.2) Network Performance Enhancement. The PU
links may deteriorate due to shadowing and
interference. Through spectrum leasing, one or
more SUs form an alternative route and relay
PUs’ traffic, and this enhances the PUs’ network
performance, such as successful transmission
rate, throughput, end-to-end delay, and energy
efficiency [8].
(A2.1) Dedicated Channel Access. The SUs access white
spaces allocated by PUs. Subsequently, this
enhances the SUs’ throughput performance.
Since spectrum leasing enhances the through-
put performance of PUs (A1.2), it reduces the
transmission time of PUs, therefore leaving
more white spaces and transmission opportuni-
ties to SUs for dedicated access [9].
The advantages motivate PUs and SUs to participate
in spectrum leasing. For instance, in [5], spectrum leasing
maximizes a weighted sum of PUs’ and SUs’ throughput
performance.
This paper provides an extensive survey on existing
spectrum leasing schemes in CRNs. The purposes are to
establish a foundation and to spark new interests in this
research area covering new kinds of CR networks such as
CR sensor networks [4]. Our contributions are as follows.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 present the functionalities, character-
istics, and challenges, respectively. Section 5 presents vari-
ous spectrum leasing schemes in CRNs. Section 6 presents
performance enhancement achieved by spectrum leasing
schemes. Section 7 presents open issues. Finally, we present
conclusions.
2. Functionalities of Spectrum Leasing in
Cognitive Radio Networks
This section discusses the functionalities of PUs and SUs
for spectrum leasing in CRNs. Generally speaking, spectrum
leasing is comprised of the following functionalities.
(F1) PU’s Function
(F1.1) Determination of the Cost of White Spaces. PUs
determine the cost (e.g., monetary price) of
white spaces to be imposed on SUs.
(F1.2) Determination of PUs’ and SUs’ Channel Access
Time. PUs are the rightful owners of the licensed
spectrum, and so the PU Base Station (BS)
may determine suitable channel access time for
transmission opportunities for both PUs and
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SUs. For instance, in centralized networks, the
PUhosts send their respective information (e.g.,
idle time) to PU BS. Subsequently, the PU BS
allocates transmission opportunities for PU and
SUnetworks. In other words, the PUs determine
the amount of white spaces to be leased to
SUs. The objective is to maximize the network
performance (e.g., throughput) of PUs and SUs
[10, 11].
(F1.3) Relay Selection. PUs select the SUs that provide
the highest gain (e.g., PU-SU linkswith the best-
known signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)) as relays in
order to maximize throughput performance.
(F1.4) PUs’ Packet Transmission. PUs transmit their
own packets to destination in order to enhance
their network performance.
(F2) SU’s Function
(F2.1) Collaborator Selection. SUs select the suitable
PUs to collaborate with. This covers the eval-
uation of the gain (e.g., the amount of white
spaces with sufficient SNR) and cost (resources
required to relay PUs’ traffics, such as energy
consumption).
(F2.2) Determination of SU’s Channel Access Time. SUs
determine the amounts of white spaces, which
increase with channel access time, to request
from PUs based on the cost imposed by the
PUs. For instance, in a Time-Division Multiple
Access (TDMA) system, SUs must determine
the optimal time duration in which they must
involve as relay to transmit PU packets and to
transmit their own packets [8].
(F2.3) SUs’ Packet Transmission. SUs transmit pack-
ets, and this involves two phases. Firstly, the
SUs relay PU packets. To ensure continuous
collaboration with PUs, the SUs must achieve a
certain level of network performance enhance-
ment while relaying the PUs’ packets. Secondly,
the SUs transmit their own packets. Spatial
reuse is possible, and so the SUs must mini-
mize interference among themselves [12]. For
instance, in centralized networks, SU BS and
hostsmay serve as relays to transmit PUpackets,
and subsequently the SU BS allocates the white
spaces offered by PUs to its SU hosts fairly [10,
13].
Spectrum leasing involves several steps and message
handshaking, and we describe a general procedure in
Figure 2. Consider two centralized PU and SU networks,
which are collocated in the same area. Several PUhosts (or SU
hosts) are associated with a PU BS (or SU BS).The procedure
is as follows.
Step 1. ThePUhosts send information on their respective idle
periods (or white spaces) to PU BS.
J PU hosts PU BS SU BS K SU hosts
Step 1
Step 2
Step 5
Step 3
Step 4
Step 6Step 7
Step 8
Step 9
Step 10 Step 10
Figure 2: A general spectrum leasing procedure.
Step 2. The PU BS determines the cost (F1.1) and duration
(F1.2) of white spaces. There are 𝐽 PU hosts to be leased to
SUs.
Step 3. The PU BS sends the cooperation information (e.g.,
the cost and duration, as well as SNR of the white spaces) to
SU BS.
Step 4. The SU BS broadcasts the cooperation information to
its SU hosts.
Step 5. The SU hosts determine the optimum transmission
and relaying strategies (i.e., (F2.2) and (F2.3)) using the
cooperation information. If auction mechanism is applied,
the SU hosts may determine bid values.
Step 6. The SU hosts send their respective decisions (e.g.,
strategies and bid values) to SU BS.
Step 7. The SUBS decides to accept the lease or not and select
the suitable PUs to collaborate with (F2.1).
Step 8. The SU BS sends its decisions to PU BS.
Step 9. The PU BS decides to lease or not and select the
suitable SUs as relays (F1.3).
Step 10. Finally, based on the lease, the PU BS transmits its
packets (F1.4) directly through a single hop, or indirectly
through SU relay nodes, to the PU BS’s destination node.The
SU BSmay divide the white spaces and assign the access time
of each white space to each SU hosts (F2.2).The SUs transmit
packets accordingly (F2.3).
3. Characteristics of Spectrum Leasing in
Cognitive Radio Networks
This section discusses the characteristics of spectrum leasing
in CRNs. There are three characteristics as follows.
4 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
(C1) Network Topology: Centralized (C1.1) and Distributed
(C1.2). In centralized networks (C1.1), a central entity
which is usually referred as Base Station (BS) is
responsible for communications between PU and
SU networks [14], whereas, in distributed networks
(C1.2), BS does not exist, and PUs and SUs share
their information through a common control channel
[14]. For instance, in [5], a centralized network (C1.1)
topology is used, in which PUs are leaders and
responsible to select the most appropriate SU for
cooperative communication and hence the SUs are
followers.
(C2) Intracooperative Mode: Intracooperative (C2.1) and
Nonintracooperative (C2.2). The PUs may cooper-
ate among themselves through an intra-cooperative
approach in order to achieve the advantages (A1.1)-
(A1.2) and (A2.1). Likewise, the SUs may adopt
the same approach. In Figure 3, the intracooperative
(C2.1) mode is shown in (a) and (c) and from
the SU’s perspective, the SUs may cooperate among
themselves and jointly improve network-wide perfor-
mance such as throughput performance, as well as
to reduce the monetary and nonmonetary spectrum
leasing costs imposed by PUs. In other words, a group
of SUs may lease a channel and subsequently share
the channel among themselves in order to reduce
spectrum leasing costs. In Figure 3, the nonintraco-
operative (C2.2) mode is shown in (b) and (d) and
from the PU’s perspective, each PUmay competewith
each other to lease their respective white spaces and
hence each PU may set a competitive price based on
the demand of channel access from SUs. From the
SU’s perspective, the SUs may also compete with each
other to acquire the white spaces through auction-
based mechanisms [15]. For instance, in [5], each SU
optimizes its power allocation in the transmission of
PU packets in order to fulfill the packet transmission
requirements of PUs. This helps each SU to remain
competitive in order to obtain white spaces in the
upcoming auctions and this has been shown to
improve SU throughput performance.
(C3) Intercooperative Mode: Intercooperative (C3.1) and
Nonintercooperative (C3.2). PUs and SUsmay cooper-
ate with each other in order to achieve the advantages
(A1.1)-(A1.2) and (A2.1). In Figure 3, the intercoop-
erative (C3.1) mode is shown in (c) and (d) and
the PUs and SUs cooperate with each other, and so
this improves the overall network-wide performance
such as throughput performance. In Figure 3, the
nonintercooperative (C3.2) mode is shown in (a) and
(b) and the PUs and SUs are referred to as selfish
users, and they do not cooperate with each other. For
instance, in [16], the PUs attempt to maximize their
profit or reward out of the white spaces, while the SUs
attempt to reduce their cost.
4. Challenges of Spectrum Leasing in
Cognitive Radio Networks
This section discusses the challenges associated with spec-
trum leasing in CRNs. There are three challenges as follows.
(H1) Increasing the Monetary Gain of PUs. PUs aim to
increase their monetary gain through spectrum leas-
ing. This encourages the PUs to participate in spec-
trum leasing by increasing the amount of white spaces
available to SUs. Subsequently, this increases PUs’
and SUs’ throughput performance [10]. The PUs may
cooperate or compete with each other to lease their
white spaces. As an example, in [10], PUs cooperate
with each other, and linear programming is applied
to set the optimal price of the white spaces in order to
increase their monetary gain. As another example, in
[16], PUs compete with each other, and game theory
is applied to set the optimal price of the white spaces
in order to increase their monetary gain.
(H2) Selecting an Optimal Channel with White Spaces by
SUs. SUs aim to access the licensed channel or white
spaces in order to increase their network performance
(e.g., throughput). So, this encourages the SUs to
participate in spectrum leasing and subsequently
increases PUs’ and SUs’ network performance [17].
However, the access to white spaces by SUs requires
monetary cost, and so there is a need to find an
optimal channel that provides the best possible net-
work performance while incurring the least possible
cost. For instance, Cao et al. [5] propose a spectrum
sharing policy in which white spaces are being leased
to SUs, in order to increase the network capacity of SU
network.
( H3) Scheduling theChannel Access of PUs and SUs.ThePUs
schedule the time for the transmissions of PUs’ and
SUs’ packets in order to enhance their respective QoS
performance (e.g., throughput). The time allocation
for SUs’ links must be sufficiently higher compared
to that of PUs’ links in order to reap the benefits
of spectrum leasing [9]. Otherwise, the queue size
at SU relay nodes may grow and eventually become
insufficient to accommodate new packets from both
PUs and SUs leading to packet loss. However, the
white spaces being leased to SUsmay not be sufficient
to cater for PUs’ and SUs’ packets. For instance,Huang
et al. [18] propose a coalition game to allocate a
suitable fraction of channel access time among PUs
and SUs, so that SUs transmit PUs’ packets as well as
their own packets.
(H4) Continuous Monitoring of White Spaces Being Leased
to SUs by PUs. Upon negotiation, the PUs and SUs
may need to monitor the white spaces (e.g., amount
and channel quality) and the Quality of Service (QoS)
of packet transmission in order to make sure that
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 5
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Figure 3: Mode of cooperation between PU and SU network.
each party follows suit. However, the continuous
monitoring of SUs requires more intelligence to be
incorporated into the PU network. For instance, in
[15], PUs additionally acts as an online auctioneer to
monitor the SUs activities. Likewise, in [19], PUs need
to ensure that the interference caused by SUs is less
than the acceptable interference level. Furthermore,
SUs also need tomonitor the SUs’ signal level in order
to reduce interference with PUs [20].
5. Spectrum Leasing Schemes in
Cognitive Radio Networks
This section presents existing work on spectrum leasing
schemes in CRNs. The schemes are categorized with respect
to the challenges (see Section 4) and on the basis of adopted
approaches (e.g., game theoretic approaches and nongame
theoretic approaches) to address the challenges. The game
theoretic approaches, such as Stackelberg game [21], are used
to achieve the equilibrium state (e.g., Nash equilibrium [22])
and it involves PUs and SUs as players of the game. Examples
of the nongame theoretic approaches are reinforcement
learning [23] and convex optimization [24]. Table 1 presents
the gains, functions, and characteristics of the spectrum
leasing schemes. The performance enhancement achieved by
each scheme is shown in Table 2 (see Section 6).
5.1. Increasing the Monetary Gain of PUs. There are six spec-
trum leasing schemes that focus on addressing the challenge
of increasing the monetary gain of PUs that motivates the
PUs to participate in spectrum leasing. These schemes have
been shown to increase the monetary gain of PUs, as well as
to enhance PUs’ or SUs’ QoS performance (e.g., throughput).
5.1.1. SchemesThat Use GameTheoretic Approaches. Alptekin
and Bener [16] propose one PU F(1) and one SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of white
spaces (F1.1), as well as collaborator selection (F2.1) in
order to increase PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1) and to provide
dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1)
SU networks. The purpose is to maximize the PUs’ profit
as seller in terms of its utility function 𝑈𝑝, which helps to
satisfy theQoS parameters (e.g., jitter) of SUs as buyers, in the
presence of 𝐽 PUs and𝐾 SUs.The functionalities aremodeled
and solved using game theory and the Nash equilibrium in a
nonintracooperative (C2.2) mode and non-intercooperative
(C3.2) mode, respectively. The cumulative utility function of
𝐽 PUs is defined as
𝑈𝑝 =
𝐽
∑
𝑗=1
𝑝𝑗𝑘 ⋅ 𝑑𝑗𝑘 − 𝑐𝑗𝑘 ⋅ 𝑑𝑗𝑘, (1)
where 𝑗 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝐽}, 𝑝𝑗𝑘 is the price that PU 𝑗 imposes on
SU 𝑘, 𝑑𝑗𝑘 is the demand factor (i.e., SU 𝑘’s expectation onQoS
requirement including jitter and throughput from PU 𝑗), and
𝑐𝑗𝑘 is the cost associatedwith the channel leased to SU 𝑘which
must be paid by PU 𝑗 to regulatory authorities (e.g., Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)).The PU 𝑗 determines
the cost of white spaces (F1.1) and on that basis selects SU 𝑘
if the difference between price 𝑝𝑗𝑘 and cost 𝑐𝑗𝑘 in PU utility
function is positive, which indicates a monetary gain for PU
𝑗. The SU 𝑘 selects a PU collaborator (F2.1) to achieve its QoS
level as indicated in the demand factor 𝑑𝑗𝑘 while paying the
PU 𝑗 at the specified price 𝑝𝑗𝑘. It has been shown that PUs are
more likely to fulfill the SUs’ QoS demandwith the increment
of price 𝑝𝑗𝑘 (i.e., monetary gain).
Lin and Fang [25] propose one PU F(1) and one SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of white
spaces (F1.1), as well as SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3) in
order to increase PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1) and to provide
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dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2)
SU networks. The purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’
utility functions 𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠, respectively, while taking into
account the mutual benefits of PUs (or sellers) and SUs
(or buyers). The functionalities are modeled in the presence
of 𝐽 PUs and 𝐾 SUs and solved using a two-level game
that is split into PU-level game and SU-level game in a
non-intracooperative (C2.2) mode and non-intercooperative
(C3.2) mode, respectively. In this hierarchy of games, PUs
compete with each other to lease their spectrum to SUs by
adjusting their price of white spaces in order to maximize
their respective utility functions; each SU attempts to lease
a certain amount of white spaces from PU that provides the
optimal quality white spaces. The PUs’ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 utility function
is defined as
𝑈𝑝,𝑗 =
𝐾
∑
𝑘=1
𝐵𝑗𝑘 {𝑝𝑗𝑘 − 𝑐𝑗} , (2)
where 𝐵𝑗𝑘 is the bandwidth (or white spaces) that PU 𝑗
allocates to SU 𝑘, 𝑝𝑗𝑘 is the price that PU 𝑗 imposes on SU
𝑘, and 𝑐𝑗 is the cost associated with the channel leased to SU
𝑘 which must be paid by PU 𝑗 to regulatory authorities (e.g.,
FCC). A PU decides to play a game if price 𝑝𝑗𝑘 is greater than
cost 𝑐𝑗 of the leased channel (F1.1).The SUs’ utility function is
defined as
𝑈𝑠 = {
log
2
(1 + 𝑅𝑠,𝑘) Case-I
log
2
(1 + 𝑅
MAX
𝑠,𝑘
) Case-II,
(3)
Where 𝑅𝑠,𝑘 and 𝑅
MAX
𝑠,𝑘
are the transmission rate, as well as its
maximum value, of SU 𝑘. In Case-I, PU allocates lesser white
spaces to SU 𝑘 than it demands, while in Case-II, PU allocates
higher bandwidth to SU 𝑘 than it demands. The higher the
amount of white spaces provided by PU to SU, the higher is
the transmission rate of SU 𝑘 (F2.3). It has been revealed that
the number of SUs increases with the price of white spaces
that PUs impose to SU.
Yi et al. [10] propose three PU F(1) and two SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of white
spaces (F1.1), relay selection (F1.3) and PUs’ packet trans-
mission (F1.4), as well as determination of SU’s channel
access time (F2.2), and SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3) in
order to increase PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1) and to provide
dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1)
SU networks. The purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’
network utility functions, 𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠, respectively. The PUs
and SUs are rational and selfish in nature. The functionalities
are modeled and solved using Stackelberg game, in which
the PU is the leader and the SU is the follower in an intra-
cooperative (C2.1) mode and inter-cooperative (C3.1) mode,
respectively. The Nash equilibriummaximizes both PUs’ and
SUs’ utility functions, 𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠. The PUs’ utility function is
defined as
𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢𝑑 + 𝑢𝑟, (4)
where 𝑢𝑑 and 𝑢𝑟 are revenues. Revenue 𝑢𝑑 is dependent on
the ratio of total PUs’ packet transmissions, which include
successful packet transmissions through direct transmissions
(i.e., fromPUhost to PUBS) and relaying through SUs to total
traffic demand of all PU hosts. Revenue 𝑢𝑟 is derived from the
white spaces being leased to SUs. The SUs’ utility function is
defined as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 − 𝑢𝑟, (5)
where 𝑢𝑠 is derived from the total SUs’ packet transmissions
from all SU hosts. Both𝑈𝑝 and𝑈𝑠 take into account the SNR
of the channels. There are two main steps in the Stackelberg
game. Firstly, the PU BS (or leader) determines its strategy
comprised of a set of potential SU relaying nodes (F1.3) and
the costs (i.e,. the price of white spaces per unit access time)
to be imposed on SUs (F1.1) and sends the PUs’ strategy to SU
BS. Using the fixed leader’s strategy, the SU BS (or follower)
determines the amount of white spaces to request from PUs
based on the costs (F2.1); hence, higher cost may reduce the
amount of white spaces to request. The SU BS sends the SU
strategy to PU BS. Secondly, using a fixed follower’s strategy,
the PU BS selects relay nodes and finalizes the costs and start
packet transmissions (F1.4). Similarly, the SU BS allocates the
leased white spaces amongst SUs for their respective packet
transmission (F2.3). The spectrum leasing scheme has been
shown to increase PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions,𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠,
as well as to increase the amount of white spaces being leased.
This scheme also decreases the price of white spaces per unit
access time.
5.1.2. Schemes That Use Nongame Theoretic Approaches. Kim
and Shin [26] propose one PU F(1) function, namely, deter-
mination of the cost of white spaces (F1.1) in order to increase
PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1) in distributed (C1.2) SU networks.
The purpose is to maximize the PUs’ profit by controlling
the SUs’ admission and eviction strategies. The admission
strategy allows the SUs to utilize PUs’ channels on the basis of
the requested amount of white spaces, which basically yields
the PUs’ profit. Hence, if SUs demands a small amount of
white spaces, then PUs may reject their admissions due to
the less monetary gain. This is because the PUs are interested
to allocate white spaces to SUs that request larger amount
of white spaces in order to maximize their monetary gain,
whereas the eviction strategy is set so that SUs evacuate the
channel immediately if PUs’ activities reappear. The function
is modeled and solved using semi-Markov decision process
and linear programming in a non-intracooperative (C2.2)
mode and non-intercooperative (C3.2) mode, respectively.
The PUs allocates their underutilized channels to a group of
𝑘 SUs. The expected revenue of PUs is defined as
𝑟𝑝 = ∑
𝑘∈𝐾
𝑝𝑘𝑄𝑘𝐾, (6)
where 𝑝𝑘 is the price that 𝑘 SUs pay to PU in return of its
QoS demand 𝑄𝑘, while 𝐾 is the number of SUs in the group.
Higher PUs’ revenue, which comes with higher price of white
spaces (F1.1), indicates higher QoS demand from SUs. It has
been shown that PUs’ revenue increases with the amount of
white spaces. However, the PUs’ revenue decreases when the
white spaces become oversupplied.
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Song and Lin [13] propose one PU F(1) and one SU
functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of white
spaces (F1.1), as well as SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3) in
order to increase PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1) and to provide
dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2)
SU networks. The purpose is to maximize the profit of
PUs while allocating the white spaces to SUs. The function
is modeled and solved using auction-based property-rights
model mechanism in a nonintracooperative (C2.2) mode
and nonintercooperative (C3.2) mode, respectively. In a
property-rights model, SUs are divided into non-overlapping
groups and a leader is elected from each group. The auction
mechanism is divided into time windows, and each window
is further divided into two phases, namely, auction and
communication. There are four main purposes in regard to
the auctionmechanism. Firstly, it maximizes the overall spec-
trum utilization. Secondly, it maximizes the number of SU
winners (or SU groups that gain a channel). Thirdly, it fulfills
the bandwidth requirement of SUs. Note that the channels
are heterogeneous and each channel has different amount of
bandwidth (or white spaces). Fourthly, it maximizes the PUs’
revenue. In a round of bidding, each SU leader determines a
bid value based on hungry degree, which takes into account
the amount of white spaces required by its group of SUs.
During the auction phase, the PU auctions off 𝑛 channels
with white spaces to 𝑚 SU leaders in two phases. Each SU
leader uses an auction phase, which is based on its bandwidth
requirement, to bid for a leasing channel. Higher value of
hungry degree leads to higher bid value. During the first
phase of auction, in order to meet the first, second, and third
purposes, the PU grants channels to as many groups of SUs
as possible to meet their respective minimum requirement
on the amount of white spaces. During the second phase
of auction, in order to achieve the fourth purpose, the PU
allocates the channels with white spaces to SU leaders that
offer higher bid values (F1.1). During the communication
phase (F2.3), the SUs transmit packets and the PU keeps track
of availablewhite spaces for auctions in the next timewindow.
The spectrum leasing scheme has been shown to increase
throughput performance in regard to vacant channels.
Wu et al. [7] propose one PU F(1) function, namely,
determination of the cost of white spaces (F1.1) in order to
increase PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1) and to provide dedicated
channel access to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1) SU net-
works. The purpose is to maximize the PU monetary gain
and SUs network utility function 𝑈𝑠, while preventing the
collusive SUs to access the PUs’ white spaces. The collusive
SUs form a coalition and deliberately decrease the price
of white spaces offered by PUs. The function is modeled
and solved using binary linear programming and convex
optimization in an intra-cooperative (C2.1) mode and non-
intercooperative (C3.2) mode, respectively. Binary linear
programming is a mathematical method to determine the
optimal results that comprises binary integers (i.e., 0 and
1). The PU sells white spaces to 𝐾 SUs with the assistance
from a third-party spectrum broker. Upon the reception of
bid values 𝑏𝑘 = {𝑏1, 𝑏2, . . . , 𝑏𝐾} from 𝐾 SU, the spectrum
broker announces the winning SUs by defining the channel
allocation 𝑥𝑘 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, . . . , 𝑥𝐾} and the associated price
𝑝 = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝐾} for 𝐾 SUs. For the winning SUs, the
channel allocation 𝑥𝑘 is set to one (i.e., 𝑥𝑘 = 1), which
indicates that the channel has been allocated to winner SU
𝑘. The gain of each winning SUs is 𝑔𝑘, which lead to an
efficient channel allocation which is used to compute the
utility function of SUs; that is,𝑈𝑠 = ∑
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑔𝑘 ⋅𝑥𝑘. Higher values
of 𝑈𝑠 indicate higher number of winning SUs in the auction
for white spaces. It has been shown that, as the number of
winning SUs increases, the price of the white spaces imposed
by the PUs as sellers also increases.
5.2. Selecting an Optimal Channel with White Spaces by SUs.
There are six spectrum leasing schemes that focus onmotivat-
ing the SUs to participate in spectrum leasing by increasing
the amount of white spaces for SUs. These schemes have
been shown to enhance PUs’ or SUs’ QoS performance (e.g.,
throughput).
5.2.1. Schemes That Use Game Theoretic Approaches. Chan
et al. [17] propose two PU F(1) and one SU F(2) func-
tionalities, namely, determination of PUs’ and SUs’ channel
access time (F1.2) and relay selection (F1.3), as well as SUs’
packet transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network
performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1) SU networks. The
purpose is to maximize the spectrum utilization of PU
and SU networks by adopting the cooperation strategies
in between of 𝐽 PUs and 𝐾 SUs in the form of PUs and
SUs utility functions, 𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠, respectively. In separate
cooperation, PU 𝑗 and SU 𝑘 form a one-to-one collaborative
relationship with each other, while in grand cooperation, PUs
and SUs form a coalition that comprises of many one-to-one
and one-to-many collaborative relationships with each other.
The functionalities are modeled and solved using canonical
coalition game theoretic framework and convex optimization
problem in a non-intracooperative (C2.2) mode and inter-
cooperative (C3.1)mode, respectively.ThePUutility function
is defined as
𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢 (𝑅𝑝) + 𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑗
− 𝐿 (𝑐𝑝) , (7)
where 𝑢(⋅) and 𝐿(⋅) are concave function that maps the PU
achievable transmission rate 𝑅𝑝 as utility gain and PU cost 𝑐𝑝
as utility loss, while 𝑝𝑠𝑝𝑗 is the price of white spaces that PU 𝑗
imposes on SUs. The SU utility function is defined as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝑟 (𝑅𝑠) + 𝑃𝑠𝑘𝑝
, (8)
where 𝑟(⋅) is (⋅) concave function that projects SU achievable
rate 𝑅𝑠 as revenue and 𝑃𝑠𝑘𝑝 is the price that PUs imposes on
SU 𝑘 in order to lease its channel. It has been shown that the
grand cooperation strategy produces higher optimal utility
value than individuals’ cooperation.
Vazquez-Vilar et al. [20] propose two PU F(1) and one
SU F(2) functionalities, namely, relay selection (F1.3), and
PUs’ packet transmission (F1.4), as well as SUs’ packet trans-
mission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network performance
of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel access to
SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1) SU networks. The purpose
12 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions 𝑈𝑝 and
𝑈𝑠 in the presence of a PU communication node pair in
order to minimize the SUs’ interference to PUs by reducing
their power consumption.The PU determines the maximum
allowable interference that PU can tolerate from SUs 𝐼𝑝max,
while the SUs aim to reduce their transmission power in order
to fulfill the requirement 𝐼𝑝max. The function is modeled and
solved using Stackelberg game in an intracooperative (C2.1)
mode and intercooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively. In this
scheme, the PU is the leader and the SU is the follower. To
foster collaboration with SUs, the PU maximizes its utility
function, and it is defined as
𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢𝑝 (𝐼
𝑠
𝑘
, Δ𝑇
𝑝
𝑝
) , (9)
where 𝑢𝑝 increases with the increment of interference from
SU 𝑘 (or 𝐼𝑠
𝑘
≤ 𝐼
𝑝
max) and decreases with the increment of PUs’
transmission powerΔ𝑇𝑝𝑝 . To foster collaborationwith PU, the
SU maximizes its utility function, and it is defined as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 (𝑅
𝑠
𝑘
, 𝐼
𝑠
𝑘
) , (10)
where 𝑢𝑠 increases with the increment of the SU transmission
rate𝑅𝑠
𝐾
and decreases with interference fromSU 𝐼𝑠
𝑘
. Note that,
𝑅
𝑠
𝑘
(𝑝𝑘) and 𝐼
𝑠
𝑘
(𝑝𝑘) increase with the SU transmission power
𝑝𝑘. Maximizing𝑈𝑠 helps tomaximize the SU 𝑘’s power vector
𝑃
𝐼
𝑝
max
𝐾
= argmax
𝑝
{𝑢𝑠(𝑅
𝑠
𝑘
, 𝐼
𝑠
𝑘
)}. This has led to computing the
overall utility function of PUs and SUs on the basis of 𝐼𝑝max.
ThePU selects a SU relay node 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (F1.3) that has the lowest
transmission power for transmission of PU packets (F1.4),
as well as SUs’ packets (F2.3) among the other SUs. It has
been shown that the proposed scheme achieves higher utility
function for both PUs and SUs compared to the traditional
scheme.
5.2.2. SchemesThat Uses NongameTheoretic Approaches. Cao
et al. [5] propose twoPUF(1) and one SUF(2) functionalities,
namely, relay selection (F1.3) and PUs’ packet transmission
(F1.4), as well as SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3) in order
to enhance the network performance of PUs (A1.2) in
centralized (C1.1) SU networks. The purpose is to maximize
the spectrum utilization of PU and SU networks, where
the PU and SU BSs operate in an intracooperative (C2.1)
mode and intercooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively.The PU
source node 𝑖 selects the best available SU relay node 𝑘, and
establishes communication with the PU destination node 𝑗.
The SU relay is used to transmit PU and SU packets using
a quadrature modulation scheme, which depends on two
factors, namely, power allocation factor 0 ≤ 𝐹𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
≤ 1 and
weight factor 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
≤ 1. The power allocation factor
determines the transmission of packets through SU relay
node. Note that the SU relay node transmits PU packets only
if 𝐹𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
= 1, the SU packets only if 𝐹𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
= 0, and both PUs’ and
SUs’ packets if 0 < 𝐹𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
< 1, whereas the weight factor deter-
mines the respective throughputs of PU and SU network,
respectively. The selected SU relay node 𝑘 transmits PU and
SU packets simultaneously using transmission power 𝑃𝑠
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
in two orthogonal channels (i.e., in-phase and quadrature
channels) exploited using a quadraturemodulation approach.
The SU relay node relays PU packets using transmission
power 𝐹𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
⋅𝑃
𝑠
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
using in-phase channel and sends SU packets
using transmission power (1 − 𝐹𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
) ⋅ 𝑃
𝑠
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
in quadrature
channel. The throughput of PUs and SUs is represented by
a weighted sum throughput 𝑇𝑇, which is defined as
𝑇𝑇 = (1 − 𝑤
𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
) ⋅ 𝑇𝑝 + 𝑤
𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
⋅ 𝑇𝑠, (11)
where 𝑇𝑝 and 𝑇𝑠 represent PUs’ and SUs’ throughput, respec-
tively. Note that 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑝 if 𝑤
𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
= 0 and 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑠 if 𝑤
𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
= 1,
while𝑇𝑝 and𝑇𝑠 achieve a balance if𝑤
𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
= 1/2. A primal-dual
subgradient algorithm, including Lagrange multipliers and
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, is used to optimize 𝐹𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
and 𝑃𝑠
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
in order to optimize the weighted sum throughput
𝑇𝑇. The PU selects a SU only if it improves throughput
performance (F1.3), while the selected SU transmits the PU
and SU packets simultaneously (F1.4), or the SU packets
only (F2.3) when the PU is inactive. Through achieving
balanced throughputs 𝑇𝑝 and 𝑇𝑠, the scheme has been shown
to maximize 𝑇𝑇, and this is due to the dependence of 𝑇𝑝 and
𝑇𝑠 on power allocation factor 𝐹
𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
and weight factor 𝑤𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
.
Jayaweera et al. [8] propose two PU F(1) and one SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, relay selection (F1.3) and PUs’ packet
transmission (F1.4), as well as SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3)
in order to enhance the network performance of PUs (A1.2)
and to provide dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in
centralized (C1.1) and distributed (C1.2) SU networks. The
purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions𝑈𝑝
and 𝑈𝑠, respectively, in terms of power savings of PUs when
they collaborate with SUs in the presence of 𝐽 PUs and𝐾 SUs.
For centralized CRNs, the functionalities are modeled and
solved using reinforcement learning in an intracooperative
(C2.1) mode, and intercooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively,
whereas for distributed CRNs, the functionalities are mod-
eled and solved using reinforcement learning in a nonintra-
cooperative (C2.2) mode and inter-cooperative (C3.1) mode,
respectively. The PU 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 utility function is defined as
𝑈𝑝 =
𝑃𝑗,𝑑 − 𝑃𝑗 (𝑃𝑘(𝑗),𝑗)
𝑃𝑗,𝑑
(𝑅𝑗 (𝛼𝑗) − 𝑅𝑗,min) , (12)
where 𝑃𝑗,𝑑 is the maximum transmission power of PU 𝑗
through direct PU-PU transmission without using a SU relay
node, 𝑃𝑗(𝑃𝑘(𝑗),𝑗) is the PU 𝑗 transmission power through PU-
SU-PU transmission using SU 𝑘 as a relay node where 𝑃𝑘(𝑗)
is the transmission power for SU 𝑘 to relay the PUs’ packets
to its destination, and 𝑅𝑗(𝛼𝑗) and 𝑅𝑗,min are the achievable
transmission rate of PU 𝑗 after allocating 𝛼𝑗 of white spaces
to SUs and the minimum transmission rate of PU 𝑗 for direct
transmission, respectively. The SU 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 utility function is
defined as
𝑈𝑠,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑗𝑊𝑗 log (1 + SNR𝑘,𝑖) (BER𝑘𝑗,min − BER𝑘𝑗,(𝑃𝑘(𝑗))) ,
(13)
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where 𝑊𝑗 is the bandwidth used by SU to transmit its own
signal, SNR𝑘,𝑖 is the signal-to-noise ratio of SU 𝑘, while
BER𝑘𝑗,min and BER𝑘𝑗,(𝑃𝑘(𝑗)) are the minimum and observed
Bit Error Rate (BER) values of SU 𝑘 while relaying PU j’s
packets. It has been shown that the transmission power of PU
decreases with increasing the transmission power of SU.
Murawski and Ekici [27] propose two PU F(1) and
one SU F(2) functionalities, namely, relay selection (F1.3)
and PUs’ packet transmission (F1.4), as well as SUs’ packet
transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network per-
formance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2) SU networks. The
purpose is to maximize the throughput of PUs and SUs
in an intra-cooperative (C2.1) mode and inter-cooperative
(C3.1) mode, respectively. The network considers a single
PU source node that communicates with a PU destination
node through direct PU-PU transmission or indirect PU-
SU-PU transmission via SU relay node. The PU destination
node transmits Request to Send (RTS), while the SU replies
with Request to Cooperate (RTC) composed of channel state
information upon receiving RTS from the PU. Subsequently,
the PUdestinationnode selects the suitable SUs as relay nodes
using the channel state information.The criterion adopted by
PU for selecting a suitable SU relaying node is based on the
basis of higher throughput value of a given PU-SU-PU link
with respect to the throughput value of PU-PU direct link.
The PU destination node sends clear to coordinate (CTC)
message to a selected SU relay node, which indicates that a
given PU-SU-PU link offers higher throughput than the PU-
PU direct link; whereas, if the throughput being offered by
the PU-SU-PU link is lower than the PU-PU direct link, then
the PU destination node sends clear to send (CTS) message
to the SU relay node, which indicates that the direct link of
PU-PU communication can take place. For the calculation
of expected throughput value either from PU-SU-PU link or
from PU-PU direct link, abackoff mechanism of distributed
coordination function [38] is used. The expected throughput
value is dependent on the probability of successful packet
transmission 𝑃𝑠, packet transmission time 𝑡packet, collision
detection time 𝑡collide, and the expected size of PU packets
𝐸packet size. Furthermore, for attaining a higher throughput
gain, adaptive modulation schemes (e.g., BPSK, QPSK, and
16-QAM) is used with respect to the SNR of the channels.
It has been shown that, higher throughput can be achieved
by changing the adaptive modulation scheme from BPSK
to QPSK, and from QPSK to 16-QAM. Additionally, higher
throughput of PUs can be achieved by reducing the number
of SUs as relaying nodes which reduces the communication
overheads.
Toroujeni et al. [28] propose two PUF(1) and one SUF(2)
functionalities, namely, relay selection (F1.3) and PUs’ packet,
transmission (F1.4), as well as SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3)
in order to enhance the network performance of PUs (A1.2)
and to provide dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in
distributed (C1.2) SUnetworks.The purpose is to increase the
link reliability by maximizing the transmission rate of a PU
communication node pair and𝐾 SUs.The functionalities are
modeled and solved using Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) [39] symbols in an intra-cooperative
(C2.1) mode and inter-cooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively.
There are a total of 𝑁𝑠 + 𝑁𝑝𝑝 OFDM symbols, in which 𝑁𝑝𝑝
symbols are dedicated for a PU-PUcommunication node pair
for direct transmission, and the 𝑁𝑠 symbols are dedicated
for PU-SU and SU-SU transmissions, respectively. The PU
selects the maximum transmission link 𝑅𝑝 either from PU-
PU direct link 𝑅𝑝𝑝 or from PU-SU-PU relayed link 𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝, and
it is defined as
𝑅𝑝 = max {𝑅𝑝𝑝, 𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝} . (14)
Each SU 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 chooses the best channel to relay the packets
from PU source node to PU destination node as well as its
own packets to another SU. The SU cooperates with PU if
SU-SU transmission rate 𝑅𝑠𝑠 is equal to the price 𝑝𝑘, which
is charged by the PU, times the SU-PU transmission rate 𝑅𝑠𝑝,
and it is defined as
𝑅𝑠𝑠 =
𝐾
∑
𝑘=1
𝑝𝑘 ⋅ 𝑅𝑠𝑝. (15)
Higher value of 𝑅𝑠𝑠 indicates higher achievable transmission
rate between SU relay node and PU destination node. It
has been shown that as the distance increases between PU
source node and SUs, it decreases the number of selected SUs
as relaying nodes. Furthermore, higher cost being incurred
by SUs reduces the achievable transmission rates of PUs
although it increases the achievable transmission rates of SUs.
5.3. Scheduling the Channel Access of PUs and SUs. There
are ten spectrum leasing schemes that focus on scheduling
of channel access time in between of PUs and SUs for their
respective transmission. These schemes have been shown to
enhance PUs’ and SUs’ QoS performance (e.g., throughput).
5.3.1. Schemes That Use Game Theoretic Approaches. Chen
et al. [29] propose two PU F(1) and one SU F(2) func-
tionalities, namely, determination of PUs’ and SUs’ channel
access time (F1.2) and relay selection (F1.3), as well as SUs’
packet transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network
performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2) SU networks.
The purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ network
utility functions 𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠 in the presence of 𝐽 PUs and
𝐾 SUs. The functionalities are modeled and solved using a
three-tier game in a non-intracooperative (C2.2) mode and
nonintercooperative (C3.2) mode, respectively. The PU and
SU network communicate with each other using a control
channel protocol in order to participate and achieve a game
equilibrium. Both PUs and SUs are rational in nature. The
PU selects the suitable SUs as relay nodes to transmit PU’s
packets in order to increase its transmission rate and the SUs
in return achieve a portion of channel access time set by
the PU to maximize their transmission rate. The PU divides
the transmission period into three phases. The first phase is
for primary transmission (PU-PU and PU-SU) during which
the PUs transmit their packets to other PUs and SUs. The
second phase is for relayed transmission (SU-PU) during
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which the SUs help the PUs to relay PUs’ packets, whereas
the third phase is for secondary transmission (SU-SU) during
which the SUs transmit their own packets. The length of the
primary transmission phase is𝛼, the relay nodes transmission
phase is (1−𝛼)(1−𝛽), and the secondary transmission phase
is (1 − 𝛼)𝛽. Higher value of 𝛼 indicates that PUs is willing to
lease its spectrum to SUs while higher value of 𝛽 encourages
SUs to collaborate and relay PUs’ packets. Thus, the PU must
determine optimal values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 (F1.2) that maximize its
own and SUs’ transmission rate. The PU 𝑗 utility function is
defined as
𝑈𝑝,𝑗 = min {𝛼𝑅𝑝𝑠,𝑘, (1 − 𝛼) (1 − 𝛽) 𝑅𝑠𝑝,𝑘} , (16)
where 𝑅𝑝𝑠 and 𝑅𝑠𝑝 are the maximum transmission rate
through SU relay nodes (F1.3). The SU 𝑘 utility function is
defined as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝛽𝑅𝑠𝑠 − (1 − 𝛼) 𝑝𝑠𝑃𝑠, (17)
where 𝑝𝑠 is the cost of per unit power 𝑃𝑠 consumed by SU
𝑘 as relay node to transmit PU source node packet to PU
destination node. Therefore, the utility function of SU 𝑘 is
the difference between its revenue in terms of achievable rate
𝑅𝑠𝑠 (F2.3) and the cost of power which SU 𝑘 must bear in
order to relay the PU’s packets. It has been shown that as
the distance increase between the PU and SUs, their utility
functions increase until a certain limit which then decrease.
Huang et al. [18] propose three PU F(1) and one SU
F(2) functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of
white spaces (F1.1), determination of PUs’ and SUs’ channel
access time (F1.2), and relay selection (F1.3), as well as SUs’
packet transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network
performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1) SU networks. The
purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions𝑈𝑝
and𝑈𝑠 in the presence of 𝐽PUs and𝐾 SUs.The functionalities
are modeled and solved using canonical coalition game in
an intracooperative (C2.1) mode and intercooperative (C3.1)
mode, respectively. The PU divides a unit time slot into
three subslots for primary transmission (PU-PUandPU-SU),
relayed transmission (SU-PU), and secondary transmission
(SU-SU), respectively.The length of the primary transmission
subslot is 1−𝛼, the relay nodes transmission subslot is 𝛽, and
the secondary transmission subslot is 𝛼 − 𝛽. Higher value of
𝛼 indicates that PUs are willing to lease their spectrum to
SUs while higher value of 𝛽 encourages SUs to collaborate
more and relay PU packets. Thus, the PU must determine
the optimal values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 that maximize its own as well
as SUs’ transmission rate. The PU 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 utility function is
𝑈𝑝 = 𝐹(𝑅𝑝), where 𝐹(⋅) is an increasing concave function
that represents PUs’ gain and 𝑅𝑝 is the minimum achievable
transmission rate, which can be either from PU-SU or from
SU-PU, and dependent on transmitter power 𝑃𝑡, channel
gain 𝐺, and noise level 𝜎2. The SUs’ utility function is 𝑈𝑠 =
𝐺(𝑅𝑠) − 𝑝𝑠, where G(⋅) is an increasing concave function that
represents SUs’ gain and 𝑝𝑠 is the price that SU needs to pay
in order to lease channels from PUs. It has been shown that
as the SUs’ channel access time increases, the transmission
rate of SUs increases significantly, which increases the PUs
monetary gainwhile decreasing its transmission rate since SU
uses more power to transmits its own packets.
Wang et al. [30] propose three PU F(1) and two SU
F(2) functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of
white spaces (F1.1), determination of PUs’ and SUs’ channel
access time (F1.2), and relay selection (F1.3), as well as
determination of SU’s channel access time (F2.2) and SUs’
packet transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network
performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1) SU networks. The
purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions𝑈𝑝
and 𝑈𝑠, respectively, in the presence of a PU communication
node pair and 𝐾 SUs. The functionalities are modeled and
solved using Stackelberg game in an intra-cooperative (C2.1)
mode and inter-cooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively. The
PU divides the transmission period into three phases. The
first phase is for primary transmission (PU-PU and PU-
SU) during which the PUs transmit their packets to other
PUs and SUs. The second phase is for relayed transmission
(SU-PU) during which the SUs help the PUs to relay PUs’
packets whereas the third phase is for secondary transmission
(SU-SU) during which the SUs transmit their own packets.
The length of the primary transmission phase is (𝑇 − 𝑡𝑠)/2,
the relay nodes transmission phase is (𝑇 − 𝑡𝑠)/2, and the
secondary transmission phase is 𝑡𝑠. The PU utility function
is defined as
𝑈𝑝 = 𝐺SNR (SNR𝑝𝑝 + SNR𝑝𝑠𝑝)
𝑇 − 𝑡𝑠
2𝑇
, (18)
where 𝐺SNR is the channel gain per unit SNR and SNR𝑝𝑝 and
SNR𝑝𝑠𝑝 are the SNR values of PU-PU direct link and PU-SU-
PU relayed link whereas, the SUs’ utility function is defined
as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝐺𝑡𝑠
− 𝑐
𝑇 − 𝑡𝑠
2
{
(SNR𝑝𝑠 + 1) 𝑝⋅𝑡𝑠 ⋅ 𝜎
2
(SNR𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝𝑡𝑠)𝐺𝑝𝑝
} , (19)
where 𝑐 is the cost per unit energy consumption, 𝑝 is the
price that SUs needs to bear in order to buy white spaces from
PUs, and 𝜎2 is the noise variance. It has been shown that as
the distance increase between the PU and SUs, their utility
functions increase until a certain limit which then decrease.
Stanojev et al. [31] propose two PU F(1) and one SU
F(2) functionalities, namely, determination of PUs’ and SUs’
channel access time (F1.2) and relay selection (F1.3), as
well as SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance
the network performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide
dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2)
SU networks. The purpose is to maximize the PUs’ trans-
mission rate and the SUs’ utility function. The PU divides a
unit time slot into three subslots for primary transmission
(PU-PU and PU-SU), relayed transmission (SU-PU), and
secondary transmission (SU-SU), respectively. The length of
the primary transmission subslot is (1 − 𝛼) ⋅ 𝑡slot, the relay
nodes transmission subslot is 𝛼 ⋅ 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑡slot, and the secondary
transmission subslot is 𝛼 ⋅ (1 − 𝛽) ⋅ 𝑡slot. Higher value of 𝛼 and
lower value of 𝛽 encourage SUs to collaborate, and so the PU
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must determine optimal values of 𝛼 and 𝛽, while maximizing
its own transmission rate. The functionalities are modeled
and solved using Stackelberg game in a nonintracooperative
(C2.2) mode and intercooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively.
In this scheme, PU is the leader and SU is the follower. The
game aims to foster collaboration between PUs and SUs by
maximizing the PUs’ transmission rate and enhancing the
SUs’ utility function. The PU source node 𝑖 chooses a set
of SU relay node 𝑘 that provides an optimum value of PU
transmission rate, which is dependent on the transmission
rate from PU source node 𝑖 to SU relaying node 𝑘, or 𝑅𝑝𝑠
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
,
while SU relaying node 𝑘 calculates the transmission rate
from SU relay node 𝑘 to PU destination node 𝑗, or 𝑅𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
, as
well as 𝛽. Hence, the value of 𝛽 must be chosen carefully to
encourage collaboration between PU and SU. The choice of
𝛽 must maximize the SU-PU transmission rate (𝛼 ⋅ 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑡slot) ⋅
𝑅
𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
, on the other hand, the choice of 𝛼 must maximize
the SU-SU transmission rate {(𝛼 ⋅ (1 − 𝛽)) ⋅ 𝑡slot} ⋅ 𝑅
𝑠𝑠
𝑘
. The
optimal value of 𝛽 is 𝛽 = argmax
𝛽∈[0,1]
𝛽 ⋅ 𝑅
𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
and 𝛽 is
applied in the calculation of ?̂? = 𝑓(1/𝛽).The PU source node
selects a suitable SU relay node (F1.3) to transfer its packets
to PU destination node (F1.4) if SU relay node provides
higher transmission rate; otherwise, it chooses PU-PU direct
link. The PU calculates channel access time for PUs and
SUs (F1.2). It has been shown that, as the number of SU
relay nodes increases, the outage probability of PU decreases
and the transmission rate of SUs increases. The SUs aim to
maximize their utility function in order to transmit its own
packets (F2.3). The SUs utility function is 𝑢𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑘,𝑃−𝑘
, where 𝑃𝑘
is the transmission power of SU relaying node 𝑘, and 𝑃−𝑘 is
a vector of the transmission power of the SU nonrelaying
nodes. The PU adjusts 𝛽 to determine the time distribu-
tion among PUs’ and SUs’ (F1.2) transmissions, and this is
followed by the selection of the best available SUs as relay
nodes (F1.3) for possible communication between a PU node
pair. It has been shown that the PUs’ and SUs’ throughput
performances can be increased by increasing the number of
SU relay nodes 𝑘 and decreasing the distance between PU and
SU.
Wang et al. [32] propose two PU F(1) and one SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, determination of PUs’ and SUs’ chan-
nel access time (F1.2) and relay selection (F1.3), as well as SUs’
packet transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network
performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2) SU networks. The
purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions𝑈𝑝
and𝑈𝑠 in the presence of a PU communication node pair and
𝐾 SUs. The functionalities are modeled and solved using the
game theoretic approach and the Stackelberg equilibrium in
a nonintracooperative (C2.2) mode and nonintercooperative
(C3.2) mode, respectively. In this game theoretic approach,
PUs and SUs are rational in nature, in which the PUs and
SUs attempt to achieve their respective equilibrium point.
The PU selects suitable SUs that transmit PU packets as relay
using their respective transmission power, while the SUs in
return achieve a portion of channel access time set by the PU
to transmit their own packets. The PU divides a unit time
slot into two sub-slots for primary transmission (PU-PU,
PU-SU, and SU-PU) and secondary transmission (SU-SU),
respectively. The length of the primary transmission subslot
is 𝛼, while the secondary transmission subslot is 1−𝛼. Higher
value of 𝛼 indicates that PUs are willing to lease its spectrum
to SUs in order to maximize its packet transmission while
allocating the remaining time to SUs for their own packet
transmission. Thus, PU must determine the optimal value of
𝛼 (F1.2) thatmaximize its own and SUs’ transmission rate.The
PU utility function is defined as
𝑈𝑝 = 𝛼𝑅𝑝 (𝛼) , (20)
where 𝑅𝑝(𝛼) is the achievable transmission rate through SU
relay nodes (F1.3) and it is dependent on transmitter power
𝑃𝑡, channel gain 𝐺, and noise variance 𝜎
2. The SUs’ utility
function is defined as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝑟𝑘 (𝑅𝑘) 𝑡𝑘 −
1
2
𝛼𝑃𝑘, (21)
where 𝑟𝑘, 𝑅𝑘, and 𝑡𝑘 are the revenue, achievable transmission
rate, and allocation time of SU 𝑘, and 𝑃𝑘 is the transmission
power used by SU 𝑘 to relay the PUs’ packets to PU
destination and therefore it is considered as a cost by SU
𝑘. Therefore, the utility function of SU 𝑘 is the difference
between its revenue in terms of achievable transmission rate
(F2.3) and the energy cost that SU 𝑘 must bear to relay the
PUs’ packets. It has been shown that PUs’ utility function
increases with the increment of the 𝛼 value. Furthermore,
as the distance between PUs and SUs decreases, it increases
their utility functions significantly because of higher channel
gain.
Zhang et al. [33] propose two PU F(1) and one SU
F(2) functionalities, namely, determination of PUs’ and SUs’
channel access time (F1.2), relay selection (F1.3), and SUs’
packet transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network
performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2) SU networks. The
purpose is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions
𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠 in order to enhance their transmission rate in the
presence of a PU communication node pair and 𝐾 SUs. The
functionalities are modeled and solved using game theory
and the Nash equilibrium in a non-intracooperative (C2.2)
mode and inter-cooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively. In
this game, the PU selects the suitable SUs as relay nodes
to transmit PUs’ packets using their respective transmission
power and in return, the SUs receive a portion of channel
access time set by the PU to transmit their own packets. The
PU divides a unit time slot into three subslots for primary
transmission (PU-PU and PU-SU), relayed transmission
(SU-PU), and secondary transmission (SU-SU), respectively.
The length of the primary transmission subslot is 1 − 𝛼, the
relay nodes transmission subslot is 𝛼𝛽, and the secondary
transmission subslot is 𝛼(1 − 𝛽). Higher value of 𝛼 indicates
that PUs are willing to lease its white spaces to SUs while
higher value of 𝛽 encourages SUs to collaborate more and
relay PU packets. Thus, the PU must determine optimal
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values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 (F1.2) that maximize its own and SUs’
transmission rate. The PUs’ utility function is defined as
𝑈𝑝 = 𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝 − 𝑅𝑝𝑝 + 𝛼𝑐𝑝𝑃𝑝, (22)
where 𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝 and 𝑅𝑝𝑝 are the achievable transmission rate
through SU relay nodes (F1.3) and PU-PU direct transmis-
sion. These rates are dependent on transmission power 𝑃
channel gain 𝐺 and noise power𝑁 whereas 𝑐𝑝 is the cost per
unit of transmission power consumed by PU source node to
transmit its packets to SUs and PU destination node.The SUs’
utility function is defined as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝛼 (1 − 𝛽) log2 (1 +
𝑃𝑠𝐺𝑠
𝑁
) − 𝛼𝑐𝑠𝑃𝑠, (23)
where 𝑐𝑠 is the cost per unit transmission power consumed by
SU relay node 𝑘 to transmit PU source node’s packets to PU
destination node.Therefore, the utility function of SU 𝑘 is the
difference between its revenue in terms of the achievable rate
(F2.3) and the energy cost that SU 𝑘 must bear to relay the
PUs’ packets. It has been shown that, as the distance increases
between the PU and SUs, their utility function increases until
a certain limit which then decreases.
Zhu et al. [34] propose two SU F(2) functions, namely,
collaborative selection (F2.1) and determination of SU’s chan-
nel access time (F2.2) in order to provide dedicated channel
access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2) SU networks. There
are two types ofmarkets, namely, primarymarket (comprised
of SU service providers and PUs) and secondary market
(comprised of SU service providers and SU hosts). The func-
tionalities are modeled and solved using a hierarchical game
theoretic framework comprised of upper- and lower-level
games and in a non-intracooperative (C2.2) mode and non-
intercooperative (C3.2) mode, respectively. The purpose is to
maximize the SUs’ service provider and SU network utility
functions, 𝑈𝑝,𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑈𝑠,𝑖(𝑡), respectively. The hierarchical
game theoretic framework is as follows.
(i) Secondary market allows SU hosts to purchase white
spaces from SU service providers on a short-term
basis (e.g., minutes), and it is a lower-level game
modeled by evolutionary game. Each SU service
provider 𝑖 offers white spaces, which are represented
by bandwidth 𝑏𝑖 and price 𝑝𝑖. Note that higher price
𝑝𝑖 for a particular bandwidth 𝑏𝑖 reduces demand
levels, and so it improves network performance.
Subsequently, each SU host competes and selects a SU
service provider. Hence, the secondary market imple-
ments collaborator selection (F2.1). Each SU aims to
maximize its individual utility function defined as
𝑈𝑠,𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝛼 ⋅
𝑏𝑖 (𝑡)
𝑝𝑖
, (24)
where 𝛼 is a constant based on network performance
requirement, in order to maximize its network per-
formance satisfaction.The number of SUs that choose
service provider 𝑖 is represented by 𝑛𝑖(𝑡).
(ii) Primary market allows SU service providers to pur-
chase white spaces from PUs (or spectrum brokers)
on a long-term basis (e.g., weeks or months), and it
is a upper-level game modeled by differential game.
Each SU service provider 𝑖 purchases some amount
of white spaces 𝑐𝑖(𝑡) from PUs based on the selection
of SU service providers 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) in order to maximize
profits. Hence, it implements the determination of
SU’s channel access time (F2.2). Note that higher
amount of the purchased white spaces improves
network performance and so it attracts more SUs;
however, it reduces monetary revenues. Each SU
service provider 𝑖 adjusts the amount of white spaces
𝑐𝑖(𝑡), and maximizes its profit defined as
𝑈𝑝,𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖 ⋅ 𝑛𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝛽𝑖 ⋅ 𝑐
2
𝑖
(𝑡) , (25)
where 𝑝𝑖 ⋅ 𝑛𝑖(𝑡) represents the monetary revenue,
𝛽𝑖 ⋅ 𝑐
2
𝑖
(𝑡) represents the cost paid to the PUs, and 𝛽𝑖
is a constant weight. Note that, with 𝑐2
𝑖
(𝑡), it causes
the cost to increase rapidly, and so it prevents a
SU service provider 𝑖 from being too aggressive. At
Nash equilibrium, each SU service provider obtains
maximized profit. In differential game, the SU service
providers make decision simultaneously; however,
some providers may make decision first, and they
are called the leaders. In this case, a Stackelberg
differential game can be applied to achieve Stack-
elberg equilibrium. In Stackelberg game, the leader
providers make decisions first, followed by follower
providers. So, the leader providers can achieve higher
pay-off, and the follower providers make decision
based on the optimal strategies made by the leader
providers. The spectrum leasing scheme has been
shown to increase SU service providers’ profits.
5.3.2. Schemes That Uses Nongame Theoretic Approaches.
Asaduzzaman et al. [35] propose three PU F(1) and one
SU F(2) functionalities, namely, determination of PUs’ and
SUs’ channel access time (F1.2), relay selection (F1.3), and
PUs’ packet transmission (F1.4), as well as determination
of SU’s channel access time (F2.2) in order to enhance the
network performance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated
channel access to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1) SU net-
works. The purpose is to minimize the outage probability of
PUs’ network and to maximize the outage capacity of SUs’
network. The outage probability indicates the halt of PUs’
packet transmission for a certain period of time when the
transmission signal power is less than a certain threshold
value while the outage capacity is the SUs’ transmission rate
during outage. Hence, generally speaking, the functionalities
are based on transmission rate and channel access duration of
PUs and SUs in an intra-cooperative (C2.1) mode and inter-
cooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively.The network considers
a PU communication node pair, and it is separated by a single
centralized SU network comprised of potential SU relaying
nodes 𝐾. The PU source node 𝑖 selects the best available SU
relaying node 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and creates a multiple-hop communi-
cation with the PU destination node 𝑗. The PU source node
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makes decision whether to communicate directly or through
SU relaying nodes to the PU destination node. The selection
of SU relaying node 𝑘 is based on the transmission rate
offered by itself in a PU-SU-PU communication, 𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
. The
𝑅
𝑝𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
is computed separately in two steps. Specifically, PU
source node 𝑖 calculates the transmission rate fromPU source
node 𝑖 to SU relaying node 𝑘, or 𝑅𝑝𝑠
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
and SU relaying node
𝑘 calculates the transmission rate from SU relaying node
𝑘 to PU destination node 𝑗, or 𝑅𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
. Subsequently, the PU
source node 𝑖 selects the best available SU relaying node 𝑘 ∈
𝐾 based on the transmission rate of the bottleneck link or
𝑅
𝑝𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
= min{𝑅𝑝𝑠
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
, 𝑅
𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
}. The PU source node 𝑖 communicates
through SU relaying node 𝑘 when 𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
> 𝑅
𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑗
; otherwise,
the PU source node 𝑖 chooses to communicate directly with
PU destination node, where 𝑅𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑗
represents the transmission
rate of PU-PUdirect transmission.Note that the transmission
rates𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
and𝑅𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑗
are dependent on SNR.The PU divides the
transmission period into three phases. The first phase is for
primary transmission (PU-PU and PU-SU) during which the
PUs transmit their packets to other PUs and SUs.The second
phase is for relayed transmission (SU-PU) during which the
SUs help the PUs to relay PUs’ packets, whereas the third
phase is for secondary transmission (SU-SU) during which
the SUs transmit their own packets. The first two phases,
namely, 𝐴 and 𝐵, are allocated to the transmission of PU
packets, specifically PU-SU and SU-PU, respectively, while
the third phase 𝐶 is for SU-SU transmission. Hence, the
outage capacity of SU is dependent on the time duration
of phase 𝐶 and the transmission rate of SU-SU. Denote the
requirement on PU’s transmission rate by 𝑅𝑖𝑗; the outage of
PU occurs whenever 𝑅𝑝𝑠𝑝
𝑖𝑗,𝑘
< 𝑅𝑖𝑗 and 𝑅
𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑗
< 𝑅𝑖𝑗. The PU
source node selects a suitable SU relay node (F1.3) to transfer
its packets to PU destination node (F1.4) if SU relaying node
provides higher transmission rate; otherwise, it chooses PU-
PU direct link.The PU calculates channel access time for PUs
(F1.2) and SUs (F2.2). It has been shown that as the number
of SU relaying nodes increases, the outage probability of PU
decreases and the transmission rate of SUs increases.
Khalil et al. [36] propose three PU F(1) and one SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, determination of PUs’ and SUs’ chan-
nel access time (F1.2), relay selection (F1.3), and PUs’ packet
transmission (F1.4), as well as SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3)
in order to enhance the network performance of PUs (A1.2)
and to provide dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in
centralized (C1.1) SU networks. The purpose is to maximize
the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions 𝑈𝑝 and 𝑈𝑠, respectively.
The functionalities are modeled and solved using Lyapunov
Optimization [40] in a non-intracooperative (C2.2) mode
and inter-cooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively. The PU
divides a unit time slot into three sub-slots for primary
transmission (PU-PU and PU-SU), relayed transmission
(SU-PU), and secondary transmission (SU-SU), respectively.
The length of the primary transmission sub-slot is 1 − 𝛼, the
relay nodes transmission sub-slot is 𝛼𝛽, and the secondary
transmission sub-slot is 𝛼(1 − 𝛽). The main objective of the
PU 𝑗’s utility function is to improve its transmission rate, and
it can be computed with and without the cooperation from
SUs as relay nodes as follows:
𝑈𝑝 = {
𝑅𝑝,𝑗, PU-PU transmission
(1 − 𝛼) ⋅ 𝑅𝑝,𝑗𝑘, PU-SU-PU transmission,
(26)
where 𝑅𝑝,𝑗 represents the PUs’ achievable direct transmission
rate without any cooperation with SUs and 𝑅𝑝,𝑗𝑘 represents
the achievable PUs’ transmission rate in cooperationwith SUs
as relaying nodes. Higher 𝑈𝑝 = 𝑅𝑝,𝑗 is applied when PUs’
direct transmission rate is greater than the PUs’ transmission
rate in cooperation with SUs; otherwise, 𝑈𝑝 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝑝,𝑗𝑘 is
applied. The PU cooperates with SU when transmission rate
is at least equal to its minimum transmission rate 𝑅𝑝,𝑗 (or
𝑅𝑝,𝑗 ≤ 𝑅𝑝,𝑗𝑘). The main objective of SU 𝑘’s utility function
is to improve its own transmission rate which is defined as
𝑈𝑠 = 𝛼 (1 − 𝛽) 𝑅𝑠,𝑘, (27)
where 𝑅𝑠,𝑘 represents the transmission rate of SU 𝑘. Higher
𝑈𝑠 indicates that the transmission rate of SU 𝑘 increases
due to the higher amount of channel access time being
allocated for its own transmission. It has been shown that,
the proposed scheme achieves higher transmission rate due
to the cooperation between PUs and SUs.
Zhou et al. [11] propose one PU F(1) and two SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of white
spaces (F1.1), as well as determination of SU’s channel
access time (F2.2) and SUs’ packet transmission (F2.3) in
order to increase PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1) and to provide
dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in distributed (C1.2)
SU networks. The purpose is to enable the SUs to acquire
the white spaces efficiently when PUs intends to lease it in
order tomaximize themonetary gain of PU and transmission
rate SU networks. The functionalities are modeled and
solved by introducing rules for spectrum management and
spectrum leasing in an intra-cooperative (C2.1) mode and
inter-cooperative (C3.1) mode, respectively. The spectrum
management rule is set by the PUBS to regulate the spectrum
leasing process in order to maximize PUs’ revenue F(1.1)
and guarantee a fair spectrum trade market by offering
the discounted spectrum price to SUs in combination with
spectrum and time optimization. The spectrum leasing rule
is set by the SUs, through which SUs takes the decision to
acquire the white spaces from PUs if it fulfills the bandwidth
requirements desired by SUs for a specified period of time
(F2.2), which SUs mentioned to PU BS for its packet trans-
mission (F2.3). It has been shown that as PU allocates more
channel bandwidth to SUs while increasing the number of
transmission slots, it maximizes the SUs transmission rate
and throughput.
5.4. Continuous Monitoring of White Spaces Being Leased to
SUs by PUs. There are four spectrum leasing schemes that
focus on the monitoring of SUs’ channel access activities in
spectrum leasing by PUs’, so that SUs are ensued to follow (or
fulfill) suit according to spectrum leasing contract with PUs.
These schemes have been shown to enhance PUs’ or SUs’ QoS
performance (e.g., throughput).
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5.4.1. Schemes That Use Game Theoretic Approaches. Jay-
aweera et al. [6] propose one PU F(1) and one SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, relay selection (F1.3) and SUs’ packet
transmission (F2.3) in order to enhance the network perfor-
mance of PUs (A1.2) and to provide dedicated channel access
to SUs (A2.1) in centralized (C1.1) SU networks. The purpose
is to maximize the PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions, 𝑈𝑝 and
𝑈𝑠, respectively. Both PUs and SUs are rational and selfish
in nature. The functionalities are modeled and solved using
a game theoretic framework in a nonintracooperative (C2.2)
mode and nonintercooperative (C3.2) mode, respectively.
The Nash equilibrium maximizes both PUs’ and SUs’ utility
functions,𝑈𝑝 and𝑈𝑠. Each PUactively adjusts an interference
cap 𝐼𝐶, which is the maximum level of interference from
SUs 𝐼SU. The PU selects those SUs (F1.3) that do not violate
the interference cap 𝐼𝐶, so that PU achieves its minimal
SNR and QoS level. The PUs’ utility function is defined
as
𝑈𝑝 = (𝐼𝑐,max − (𝐼𝑐 − 𝐼SU)) 𝐼𝑐. (28)
ThePUconstantly broadcasts the 𝐼𝑐 and 𝐼SU to all SUswhereas
each SU adjusts its transmission power to ensure that the
current level of interference from SUs 𝐼SU is lower than 𝐼𝑐,
in order to maximize its own rewards in terms of higher
throughput for packet transmission (F2.3). The SU utility
function is defined as
𝑈𝑠 = (𝐼𝑐 − 𝜆𝑠𝐼SU) 𝑟𝑠, (29)
where 𝜆𝑠 and 𝑟𝑠 are positive coefficient and reward function,
respectively.The spectrum leasing scheme has been shown to
increase PUs’ and SUs’ utility functions𝑈𝑝 and𝑈𝑠, aswell as to
increase the rewards (i.e., transmission rate per user). Similar
schemes have also been applied in [19, 37] as follows.
(i) In [19], the purpose is to examine the power control
mechanism and its effect on the utility function of
PUs. The PUs’ utility function, which aims to achieve
the required QoS performance of PUs and SUs, is
defined as:
𝑈𝑝 = 𝐼𝑐 − (𝐼𝑐 − 𝐼SU)
2
− (𝑒
(𝐼SU−𝐼𝑐) − 1) . (30)
Whereas, the SU utility function, which aims to achieve SUs’
energy efficiency, is defined as
𝑈𝑠 =
𝑅𝑠,𝑘 (1 − 𝑒
[0.5(SNR𝑠)])
𝑝𝑘
, (31)
where 𝑅𝑠,𝑘 and 𝑝𝑘 are the transmission rate and transmission
power of SU 𝑘. The SUs’ utility function defines SUs’ packet
transmission (F2.3), which represents the number of success-
ful transmitted bits per unit of transmission power.
(ii) In [37], the propose is to adjust the PUs’ interfer-
ence level in accordance with the SUs’ transmission
requirements of SNR and QoS levels, so that PUs and
SUs maximize their respective utility functions. The
PUs’ utility function is defined as
𝑈𝑝 = {(𝐼𝑐,max − (𝐼𝑐 − 𝐼SU)) 𝐼𝑐} ⋅ 𝑟𝑝, (32)
where 𝑟𝑝 is a continuous reward function that defines the
PUs’ gain while leasing its spectrum to SUs. The SUs’ utility
function is defined as
𝑈𝑠 =
𝑟𝑠
1 + 𝑒𝜆(𝐼SU−𝐼𝑐)
, (33)
where 𝑟𝑆 is the reward function of SUs, which depends on the
transmitting power of SU 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾.
5.4.2. Scheme That Uses Nongame Theoretic Approaches.
Sodagari et al. [15] propose one PU F(1) and one SU F(2)
functionalities, namely, determination of the cost of white
spaces (F1.1), as well as determination of SU’s channel access
time (F2.2) in order to increase PUs’ monetary gain (A1.1)
and to provide dedicated channel access to SUs (A2.1) in
distributed (C1.2) SUnetworks. Generally speaking, SUs send
private information to PUs regarding their channel access
time (i.e., arrival and departure times) and bid values during
the auction process inwhich the PUs provide suitable channel
allocations to SUs. There are two types of SUs, namely,
truthful SUs and collusive SUs. Truthful SUs provide the
private information to PUswhile the collusive SUs collaborate
among themselves through sharing the private information
and subsequently misreport the information in order to gain
the channel access. There are two approaches to misreport
the information. Firstly, the collusive SUs share the bid values
so that the SUs either set the bid value to the lowest or
slightly higher values. Secondly, the collusive SUs share the
arrival time so that the SUs either set to the arrival time
to the latest or slightly earlier values, and this minimizes
the competitiveness among the SUs for channel access in
auctions and subsequently minimizes the bid values. The
functionalities are modeled and solved using an approach
called Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) in
which a SU can reduce its payment to the PUs in an auction
process without collusion, in an intracooperative (C2.1)
mode and nonintercooperative (C3.2) mode, respectively.
Specifically, with respect to SU 𝑘, denote the bid value
by 𝑏𝑘(𝜋𝑘) and the price 𝑝𝑗𝑘 set by the PU and 𝑗 the SU
adopts a 𝜋𝑘 policy to determine its bid value that maximizes
gain 𝑏𝑘(𝜋𝑘) − 𝑝𝑗𝑘 such that if SU 𝑘 colludes with other
SUs, it fails to minimize the gain. The 𝜋𝑘 policy is the
decision policy which PUs define for the allocation of white
spaces to a truthful SU 𝑘 in the presence of SUs as bidders.
It has been shown that truthful SUs receive higher gain
and higher occurrence of winning bids for channel access
compared to collusive SUs while the PUs monetary gain
decreases.
6. Performance Enhancement of
Spectrum Leasing Schemes
Table 2 presents the performance enhancement achieved by
the spectrum leasing schemes compared to conventional and
traditional approaches inCRNs.Theperformancemetrics are
as follows.
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( P1) Lower Outage Probability. Lower outage probability
indicates lesser interruptions of packet transmissions
inwhich transmission does not take place for a certain
period of time. For instance, the interruption may be
caused by transmission power which is less than a
certain threshold value [41], as well as lack of white
spaces [42]. Lower outage probability has been shown
to enhance QoS (P3) [32].
(P2) Higher Outage Capacity. Outage capacity is the
maximum achievable transmission rate during any
instances of outage. Higher outage capacity indicates
higher achievable transmission rate in the presence
of outages from time to time, and so it also indicates
lower occurrence of outages [41]. Higher outage
capacity has been shown to enhance QoS (P3) [35].
(P3) Better QoS Level. Through spectrum leasing, the PUs
and SUs achieve QoS enhancement. For instance,
higher throughput indicates higher rate of successful
data transmission over a channel, which provides
better QoS [5]. Higher throughput may also indicate
more white spaces, in terms of time duration, being
offered to SUs by PUs at a specified cost [16].
(P4) Higher Energy Efficiency Indicates Lower Energy Con-
sumption by PUs [8]. This is because the SUs help
the PUs to relay their packets due to the low channel
quality in PUs’ direct transmission to PU destination
node [37]. With reduced unsuccessful transmission
attempts by PUs, the PUs consume lower transmis-
sion power and there are more white spaces available
to be leased to SUs for monetary gain (P5).
(P5) HigherMonetary Gain,Which is the Gain Exclusive for
PUs A(1.1). The PUs receive monetary gain as revenue
based on the price of the white spaces being offered to
SUs through spectrum leasing [10].
(P6) Balanced Trade-off between Cost of White Spaces and
Monetary Gain. Generally speaking, the cost of white
spaces paid by the SUs is set by the PUs. Higher cost
provides higher monetary gain received by PUs at the
expense of SUs. Hence, a balanced trade-off between
the cost of white spaces and monetary gain provides
a win-win solution for both PUs and SUs [16].
(P7) Balanced Trade-off between PUs’ and SUs’ Channel Ac-
cess Time. Generally speaking, higher channel access
time among the PUs may provide better QoS level
(P3) among the PUs at the expense of reduced channel
access time among SUs and vice versa [35]. Hence,
a balanced trade-off between PUs’ and SUs’ channel
access times provides a win-win solution for both PUs
and SUs.
(P8) Better Security Level. Through the detection of mali-
cious SUs that access PUs’ channels in an illegitimate
manner, better security level can be achieved con-
tributing to better QoS level (P3) (e.g., throughput)
and monetary gain (P5). For instance, in [15], the SUs
report their respective channel access time, which is
closely monitored by PUs. Hence, malicious SUs that
mislead PUs with incorrect information (e.g., channel
access time) in order to compete for channel access
can be detected by PUs. Subsequently, the PUs evict
the malicious SUs from their channels, and this has
been shown to achieve higher throughput for PUs and
SUs, as well as an increase in PUs’ monetary gain.
(P9) Lower PUs’ Interference Level. Lower interference level
to PUs in the use of white spaces by SUs provides
better QoS (P3) to PUs. For instance, in [6], a PUs’
interference cap, which is the maximum interference
level that PUs can tolerate in the use of white spaces
by SUs, is set in order to increase PUs’ and SUs’
throughput performance.
7. Open Issues
This section discusses important open issues that can be
pursued in this research area.
7.1. Enhancing Auction and Coordination Mechanisms. Gen-
erally speaking, auction enhances the performance matrices
(i.e., better QoS level (P3) and higher monetary gain among
PUs (P5)), and it requires proper coordination in which the
PUs (or SUs) make decisions on the selection of SUs (or
PUs) participating in spectrum leasing, so that both PUs and
SUs mutually agree to fulfill each others requirements. For
instance, in [8], the PUs choose the SUs that allocate higher
transmission power to relay PUs’ packets based on the bid
values received from SUs through auction.The disadvantages
are that the PUs incur high energy consumption while
exchanging control messages and making decisions on the
outcomes of auctions. Hence, a third-party auctioneer has
been proposed to receive control messages from both PUs
and SUs, as well as tomake decisions on the auction outcomes
[15]. Additionally, the purpose-built third-party auctioneer
may reduce latency associated with auction because of the
auction being its main and only task. Further investigation
can be pursued to investigate a balanced trade-off between
energy consumption and monetary gain in order to enhance
the network performance of both the networks in the pres-
ence of a third-party auctioneer.
7.2. Investigating Distributed Spectrum Leasing Schemes. Cur-
rent research focuses on centralized networks (C1.1) in which
PU BS and SU BS exist; however, this may not be the case
in distributed networks (C1.2), and so further investigation
can be pursued to investigate spectrum leasing in distributed
networks. While there are investigations into distributed SU
networks [8], this is not the case for PU networks in which
most schemes in the literature assume the presence of a
PU BS or a single PU node pair. The major challenge in
distributed SU networks is that SU BS does not exist, and so
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the SUs must coordinate among themselves to determine a
control channel for the purpose of control message exchange
in spectrum leasing. The control channel is important for
the exchange of control messages for spectrum leasing. The
lack of a control channel has been investigated based on
the assumption that the SUs are equipped with learning
capabilities [8], specifically through past experience. Further
investigation can be pursued to relax this assumption.
7.3. Implementation of Security Measures. Generally speak-
ing, the implementation of security measures to prevent
malicious SUs by PUsmay increase the performancematrices
(e.g., better QoS level (P3) and higher monetary gain by
PUs (P5)). Since the PUs can provide continuous monitoring
on SUs’ channel access the PUs can detect malicious SUs.
The challenge is to reduce the additional overheads, such as
energy consumption, incurred by the PUs.This is particularly
important because malicious SUs may access the channel
(white spaces) in an illegitimate manner, and this minimizes
the amount of white spaces for genuine SUs, which subse-
quently degrades the performance of PUs and SUs. Three
examples of security vulnerabilities associated with spectrum
leasing are as follows.
(i) SUs attempt to acquire the white spaces from PUs in
an illegitimate manner through untruthfully raising
their respective bid values (e.g., SU’s transmission
power used to relay PUs’ packets) [15].
(ii) The winning SUs may further sublease their channels
to losing SUs for monetary gain [15].
(iii) The SUs may launch collusion attacks in which SUs
participating in an auction collaboratively reduce
their bid values that may significantly reduce the
monetary gain (P5) of PUs [7].
Further investigations can be pursued to address the afore-
mentioned security vulnerabilities.
7.4. Investigating Energy-Efficient Spectrum Leasing Schemes.
In spectrum leasing, the SUs may serve as relay nodes to
transmit both PUs’ and SUs’ transmission packets; hence,
they incur higher energy consumption. However, current
literature primarily focuses on reducing energy consumption
at PUs [8, 32] and so further investigation can be pursued
to reduce energy consumption at SUs. By reducing the
transmission power at SUs, there are two main advantages as
follows.
(i) Firstly, it reduces the interference to PUs and its
neighboring SUs, and this helps to enhance the PUs’
and SUs’ performance (e.g., better QoS level (P3)).
(ii) Secondly, it reduces SUs’ monetary cost, which may
be related to energy consumption used to relay PUs’
packets [32].
Further investigation can be pursued to achieve a balanced
trade-off in order to utilize the channel and energy in an
efficient manner.
7.5. Investigating Common Assumptions of Spectrum Leasing.
Future investigation can be pursued to relax the following
common assumptions, as well as their effects, applied to the
investigation of spectrum leasing in CRNs.
(i) Each node is equipped with two transceivers, namely,
control transceiver and data transceiver. The control
transceiver is always tuned to a single common con-
trol channel, which is available at all times; however,
the existence of a common channel among nodesmay
not be realistic [13].
(ii) Each SU observes the similar white spaces, and the
transmission from each SU can be observed by all
of the other SUs [13]. This assumption may not be
realistic because each SUmay observe different white
spaces.
(iii) Each SU BS makes decision on spectrum leasing.
For instance, in [8], the SU BS makes decision for
SUs’ participation in spectrum leasing. However, the
presence of a SU BS as a decision maker may not
be feasible in distributed networks. There has been
very limited literature on distributed approaches (see
Section 7.2).
7.6. Defining the Selection and EvictionCriterion of SUs by PUs.
Generally speaking, there has been very limited research on
the selection and eviction criterion of SUs, which are used by
PUs.This helps PUs to enhance the overall QoS performance
(P3) of PUs’ and SUs’ networks. Two types of selection and
eviction criterion are as follows.
(i) PUs may allocate white spaces to SUs that demand
higher amount of white spaces in order to maxi-
mize their respective throughput and the monetary
gain while neglecting other SUs that demand lower
amount of white spaces.
(ii) PUs may monitor the SUs’ activities so that PUs
can evacuate SUs who breach the spectrum leasing
contract upon negotiations [26].
Therefore, further investigation can be pursued to define the
selection and eviction criterion in order to achieve higher
network performance.
7.7. Implementation of Hybrid Model. Generally speaking,
there has been limited research on the enhancement of QoS
performance (P3) along with the monetary gain received by
PUs (P5) in spectrum leasing. In the current literature, the
exclusive-usemodel has been widely used in which PUs share
their white spaces to SUs on lease for a definite period of
time but cannot reclaim these white spaces even if the PUs
encountered the shortage of spectrum, whereas, Kim and
Shin [26] propose a hybrid model comprised of a shared-
use model and an exclusive-use model. In shared-use model,
SUs opportunistically use the spectrum while there is no
advantage for PUs, neither in terms of monetary gain nor as
an improvement of PU network enhancement. The inclusion
of shared-usemodel gives PUs an additional privilege to evict
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the SUs whenever the PUs needs the white spaces for their
own transmission. The challenge that arises in the hybrid
model is the suspension of white spaces to SUs which is
crucial for the PUs to fulfill their spectrum requirement at the
expense of lower PU monetary gain due to deteriorating SU
packet transmission. Further investigation can be pursued to
investigate a balanced tradeoff that fulfills the PUs spectrum
shortage as well as to ensure the minimum transmission
requirements of SUs.
8. Conclusions
This paper presents a comprehensive review on spectrum
leasing schemes along with the advantages, functionalities,
characteristics, and challenges of each scheme in CR net-
works. Spectrum leasing schemes have been shown to address
the concerns poised to the traditional CR networks, so that
PUs can enhance their network performance and maximize
their monetary gain, while the SUs can enhance their net-
work performance through exclusive access to white spaces.
Examples of PU’s gains are monetary gain and network
performance enhancement, while example of SU’s gain is
dedicated channel access. To achieve these gains, PUs need
to determine the cost of the white spaces, the PU’s and SU’s
channel access time, SU’s selection as a relay nodes, and
PU’s own packet transmission, while SUs need to select the
appropriate PUs according to the SUs’ QoS requirements and
the cost of white spaces, as well as to determine channel access
time between SUs. In the literature, the network topology of
PUs and SUs can be either centralized or distributed and the
PUs and SUs operate among themselves using intracoopera-
tive and intercooperative modes, respectively. The challenges
associated with PUs are the selection of the appropriate SUs
to increase the monetary gain, the distribution of channel
access time between PUs and SUs and continuousmonitoring
of SUs’ activities, while the challenge associated with SUs
is the selection of optimal channels in order to reap the
benefits of spectrum leasing. Additionally, we discuss various
performance enhancement achieved by the spectrum leasing
schemes (e.g., lower outage probability and higher outage
capacity). Finally, we recommend some open issues in order
to spark new interests in this research area(e.g., enhancing
auction and coordination mechanism and investigation of
energy-efficient spectrum leasing schemes), as well as new
kinds of CR networks such as CR sensor networks.
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